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Following is an address by Matthew Nimetz, Counselor for the Department of State, before Duke University in Durham, North Carolina, on November 19, 1979.

Forty years ago, Winston Churchill (in a now famous piece of rhetoric) described the Soviet Union as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." He spoke, of course, before the creation of a wartime alliance between the Soviet Union and Great Britain and the United States, before the detonation of the first nuclear device, before the onset of the cold war and the division of much of the world between East and West, before the Cuban missile crisis, before the era of detente, and before the SALT process. Our relations with the Soviet Union have undergone much change in the intervening years, punctuated with major developments and occasional crises, but the aura of mystery and unpredictability still remains. Both sides have yet to arrive at a common understanding of each other, much less a common approach to participating in the wider international environment.

That this should be so is not a reflection upon the wisdom or skills of the officials who have managed our bilateral relations in the past decades. There has been no lack of desire to carve out a peaceful and productive relationship with the Soviet Union, but we remain, however, two nations with

fundamentally different points of view. Our moral values, social beliefs, and economic systems are very different. Our approach to international problem areas is often widely divergent. Our perceptions of the strategic military balance are probably quite dissimilar. Our approach to the Third World, to development issues, to the creation of a harmonious approach to North-South questions is not the same and often intensely competitive. Our methods of formulating foreign policy—including the assimilation of domestic viewpoints—are notably different. And our relationship often is influenced by developments in the international environment which neither country can control.

In large part the differences between our two countries are inescapable, and we must recognize that our bilateral relationship must reflect the fact that we are dealing with a nation and a set of leaders whose background and principles and sense of national interests are very different from our own. The frustration and disappointment that sometimes accompany the periodic setbacks in our dealings with the Soviet Union are understandable; but we should not despair that overall progress cannot be made. We should continue to seek out those areas of accommodation that are possible while accepting the fact that the Soviet leadership will

measure progress in our relations by a yardstick of their own construction.

It has historically been true that the United States and the Soviet Union have had only very few areas of contact. Our genesis as a nation was primarily in Western Europe, and our ties to that continent have traditionally been close and fruitful. Russia, on the other hand, on the periphery of Europe, retained a powerful tie to native Slavic and Central Asian traditions and culture that were untouched by the Renaissance and only superficially affected by 17th and 18th century humanism. The physical breadth and wealth of our two nations insured a degree of insularity to our two societies. We are both continental nations; the United States being surrounded by two oceans, and Russia being separated from major Western European centers by vast distances with uncertain communication.

Consequently, trade between our two countries has historically been very slight. Prior to 1917, our interests in terms of global developments centered on different portions of the world. Cultural developments and industrialization took place in each country largely independent of developments in the other. Perhaps most importantly, we developed a system of government that drew upon principles of individual liberty, representative government, and the subservience of the state to its citizens—all markedly different from the historical and cultural determinants that shaped the character of czarist rule and the Government of the Soviet Union.

National Security

Thus, the historical background alone should caution us against being too sanguine about the degree to which the interests and attitudes of our two nations can be closely reconciled. We shall continue to remain fundamentally opposed on a variety of important issues. What has changed in the last four decades is not the degree to which the world views of the United States and the Soviet Union have converged, but the number of areas in which our direct interests have intersected and occasionally clashed.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in the field of national security. We

have entered a world since 1945 in which the growing arsenals of both countries and the revolutionary change brought about by the development of nuclear weapons has made it impossible for us to ignore the potential challenges of Soviet military power. Dealing with this new factor in the U.S.-Soviet equation is perhaps the central foreign policy problem we face today. How we respond to the fact that the Soviet Union has at last emerged as a global military force, with all the political and diplomatic consequences that stem from that development, will influence the course of our international policies for some time to come and profoundly affect the character, the stability, and even the continuation of the entire international order.

Until recently, the military forces of the Soviet Union were largely oriented toward territorial defense and control of the Eastern European members of the Warsaw Pact. The U.S.S.R. has always maintained a large standing army, but these combat forces were trained and equipped primarily to fight in defense of the homeland or on the periphery of the Soviet Union. Similarly, until the present decade, the Soviet Navy lacked a significant ocean-going capability, concentrating instead upon the deployment of smaller craft designed for coastal purposes. The Soviet Air Force, although impressive in many areas, was largely made up of tactical interceptors, and the U.S.S.R. has never emphasized the development of a significant intercontinental bomber force.

Beginning in the 1960s the leadership of the Soviet Union began a major, sustained campaign to improve Soviet military capabilities across the board. Real increases were made in the Soviet defense budget on the order of 3% every year. Significant resources were funneled into an extensive program of military research and development. New weapons were acquired and eventually assigned to combat units.

As a result, major changes have taken place in the power and sophistication of the Soviet military establishment. New generations of ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], equipped with multiple warheads, have gradually been introduced into the Soviet rocket forces. The Soviet Air

Force has greatly expanded its ability to strike deep within an adversary's territory and carry out naval strike and interdiction roles. The Soviet Navy has now become a truly "blue water" force, capable of operating in all oceans of the planet and confronting us for the first time with a significant danger of interference with vital western sea lines of communication.

Why the Soviet leadership has chosen to emphasize military strength at a time when the Soviet economy is having great difficulty in meeting even the most basic domestic needs is unknown to us. Given the bitter differences in views among Marxist states and parties—between the Soviet bloc, China, Yugoslavia, Albania, and the Euro-Communists—it is hard to believe that the leaders of the Kremlin still pursue the dream of Lenin and Trotsky to subjugate the world under the unified rule of a Russian-based Communist dictatorship. To rational men those goals must long have perished as the ideological appeal of the Soviet Union has steadily diminished throughout the world. Whatever the motive, it seems obvious to us that the extent and degree of this Soviet military buildup is far in excess of what is reasonably required to protect the basic security interests of the Soviet people.

We should bear in mind that our definition of national security is not necessarily shared by Soviet defense planners. The Soviets obviously are concerned not only about the United States and our allies but about an unfriendly China on their border. Recent history plays a major role as well. Our country has not, after all, been subjected to an actual military invasion in this century. The U.S.S.R. has—twice—and with devastating results. The national calamity of World War II, with some 20 million casualties in the Soviet Union, is an experience that is deeply etched in the minds and psyches of every member of the Soviet Politburo. It has been pointed out that such a trauma contributes to a policy that errs generously on the side of over-preparedness.

But we, as careful trustees of our nation's destiny, must base our planning on what we see and assume that current Soviet military planning springs

from pragmatic and calculated geopolitical considerations. As dedicated as our nation may be to the peaceful resolution of international disputes, it is an indisputable fact that military power counts in the modern world. It counts not only in the direct application of force to the settlement of conflicts, or in the threat of its use, but also in the effects that the knowledge of superiority of military power inevitably has upon the actions that nations may choose to take or to forego when faced with a stronger and better armed adversary. There is no doubt that military strength is a powerful aspect of diplomatic relations, even if it is never actually used and never actually threatened.

U.S. Policy

Our policy in the United States has been to meet the challenge of the Soviet military buildup in two ways.

First, we are determined that our overall military capabilities remain essentially equivalent to those of the Soviet Union, and that they are sufficient to deter any aggression against the United States, our allies, or our military forces overseas.

Second, when we can reach agreement with the U.S.S.R. on the basis of enlightened self-interest, we are committed to pursuing those arms control initiatives which will reduce the likelihood of armed conflict, enhance our own national security, and contribute to international stability. These twin goals are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. Together, they will help us in managing the U.S.-Soviet military balance in the years to come.

To insure parity between the defense forces of the two sides is not to insist upon a strict numerical equilibrium based upon the accountant's ledger or the unyielding comparison of any given set of static indicators. Simply counting up the number of tanks, ships, and other weapons deployed on each side would reveal a military balance that is inherently misleading in terms of what it indicates about the relative effectiveness of the two military forces. We do not need a defense structure that is a mirror image of the Soviet Union's. Perfect symmetry will not in itself

guarantee the fulfillment of our true defense needs. Our geography is different; our relations with our neighbors are different; our economies are different; and our allies are different.

What we do need is a defense effort that is adequate to guarantee our national security, the security of our allies, and our worldwide interests. We

gone down, their defense budgets have increased again."

Given these facts, we have arrested the downward spiral in U.S. military spending. Last year, the Administration was successful in obtaining a real increase in the defense budget of 3%, and the President has made clear his commitment to an increase in the next

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are spending enough now to meet that goal, but the trends in Soviet military expenditures mean that we shall have to do more in the years to come. The Soviet military is currently outspending us, although it is worth remembering that the U.S.S.R. defense effort must draw upon a civilian economy that is much less efficient than our own. They also began their current buildup from a position of clear inferiority, so that we have had a marginal advantage for many years that has made it relatively less important that our defense expenditures match those of the Soviets.

Indeed, for most of the years in the past decade, our own military spending has actually declined when measured in constant dollars or as a percentage of gross national product. In 1960, for example, national defense expenditures amounted to \$115 billion (in 1978 dollars) and constituted slightly more than 9% of our gross national product. Those figures rose during the latter half of the decade due to our involvement in Southeast Asia, but they then began to decline. By 1977, we were actually spending \$12 billion less on defense in real terms than we were in 1960, and the percentage of our GNP allotted to the military had fallen to 5.3%.

Meanwhile, the Soviet military buildup continued unabated. (You should know that the Soviets devote about 13% of their GNP to defense.) As Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has noted, the U.S.S.R.'s commitment to rising defense budgets has been unaffected by the decisions we have made with regard to defense spending: "As our defense budgets have risen, the Soviets have increased their defense budget. As our defense budgets have

budget of at least 3%. We have certainly not been standing still during the past 10 years, but it is equally clear that further efforts are required if we are to be successful in maintaining the military balance for the future.

We have, as I say, made some impressive strides in modernizing and expanding our capacity to respond to military conflicts throughout the world. In the field of strategic nuclear weapons, the President has decided to improve the survivability of our land-based ICBM force through the development and deployment of the new, mobile MX missile system. We have just put the first of the new Trident submarines to sea and we are currently in the process of deploying the improved Trident I submarine-launched ballistic missile. In 1981, we shall begin fitting many of our B-52 strategic bombers with long-range, air-launched cruise missiles that will serve to extend the useful life of the B-52 force well into the 1980s.

We have also sought to upgrade our capabilities in the field of conventional weapons. Together with our NATO allies, we have agreed upon a long-term defense program for Western Europe that will vastly improve the alliance's ability to respond to any military threat or incursion from the Warsaw Pact. We have accelerated our programs for the acquisition of sophisticated antitank weapons and other precision-guided munitions. We have generally upgraded the overall effectiveness of our conventional forces, and we are exploring new ways of organizing military units—such as the proposed rapid deployment force—that will en-

able us to meet military situations in a flexible and effective manner. A major watershed in the deployment of theater nuclear weapons will occur next month when the NATO governments meet to decide upon the emplacement of a new generation of medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe.

SALT

Military competition can be managed, however, in ways other than mutual buildup of forces. For this reason we pursue arms control initiatives, perhaps the most important of which is SALT. SALT—the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—is certainly not a panacea that will solve all our problems, and it is also not a substitute for the increased effort we are making in terms of defense outlays. For one thing, SALT deals only with a limited category of weapons: those that are nuclear capable and that are deliverable from the territory of the United States to the Soviet Union, or vice versa. The talks have not dealt with conventional weapons or with shorter range, theater nuclear devices. These systems continue to be unconstrained by the arms control process.

Secondly, the SALT II agreement that is currently before the Senate of the United States does not go as far as we would like in limiting and restraining the strategic nuclear delivery vehicles that are included in the agreement. Both the United States and the Soviet Union will be able to modernize their strategic arsenals to some degree even with the SALT II agreement in force. We do plan, however, to make further progress in obtaining greater controls on strategic weapons in the context of the SALT III negotiations.

SALT II is an important step for the United States, however, because we will slow the momentum of Soviet strategic deployments in several crucial areas. The agreement will last until 1985, and we could well be facing a more dangerous strategic environment in that year without the controls that SALT II will provide.

• We know, for example, that the Soviet Union currently has four and possibly five new types of ICBMs either on the drawing boards or in the early stages of development. Without

SALT II, the U.S.S.R. could deploy all five new types. With SALT II, they will be limited to one totally new missile system.

• Without SALT II, the Soviet Union could deploy as many as 3,000 strategic missile launchers and heavy bombers by 1985. With SALT II, they will be limited to no more than 2,250.

• Without SALT II, the Soviet Union could have in place by 1985 as many as 1,200 ICBMs equipped with multiple warheads. With SALT II, they will be limited to a maximum of 820.

• Without SALT II, the Soviet Union could deploy 30 or 35 individual warheads on each of their largest land-based missiles. With SALT II, they will be limited to no more than 10.

• Without SALT II, it is questionable whether the Soviet Union would choose voluntarily to make real reductions in its nuclear arsenal. With SALT II, the U.S.S.R. will be forced to dismantle some 250 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles that are now targeted on the United States.

The SALT II agreement, therefore, will enhance our ability to meet the challenge of rising Soviet defense expenditures. It will do so without constraining any significant military programs that we plan to inaugurate during the term of the agreement. It will be a useful complement to our regular defense programs, and it will aid us in predicting the future course of Soviet defense decisionmaking.

Other U.S. Strengths

We should also remember that national security is made up of a number of important factors, of which military strength is only one. By most other indicators, the United States is clearly the most powerful nation in the world. In terms of our economic strength, the vitality of our basic science and technology, the appeal of our democratic lifestyle to other nations, and the political and social vitality of our society, the Soviet Union does not rank as even a distant second. Our allies and friends—Canada, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand—add overwhelmingly to Western influence and strength, particularly when compared to the demoralized and often

reluctant supporters of the Soviet Union.

Let me mention the sphere of ideas—the competition for the minds of people—as another arena of competition where I believe we have a decisive advantage, albeit one we have not used as adeptly as we might. The Soviets, trained in the Marxist-Leninist tradition, place heavy emphasis on propaganda and on ideology, while we tend to feel less comfortable with heavy-handed verbal posturing.

But we should make no mistake about the importance of articulating our values strongly, continuously, and persuasively. Western ideals of individualism, personal dignity, and representative government strike responsive cords everywhere. The results can clearly be seen in the movement of people. The Soviet Union and other Marxist states expend great effort, including the crude use of walls and barbed wire, to keep their people from leaving. Our problem, as we review our immigration and refugee policy, is to decide how many of the millions who want to participate in our society, we can reasonably accept.

It is only in the area of military strength that the U.S.S.R. has approached equivalence with us. We should not undervalue the enormous potential and capacity of the United States in nondefense matters. But we must also be realistic about preserving our ability to defend our interests, should that become necessary. For this reason, we see a new realism pervading the American polity—a realism about the world that is neither defeatist nor cocky. The next decade will require strengthened defense programs, tough negotiations, and a firmness and constancy of principle. I have no doubt that we will meet that challenge. I have no doubt that the fundamental advantages, now and for the future, lie with the West, not the East.

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